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Abstract: Evidence suggests that fathers have stronger ties to sons than daughters, which may 
result in differential investments in their children. This paper investigated whether girls’ gender 
restricts their access to fathers' contributions if they do not live together. The data used were the 
1994-2008 March/April Match Current Population Survey Child Support Supplements, a large, 
nationally representative sample which identifies child support eligible mothers of all marital 
statuses and collects information on nonresident fathers’ financial and social investments in their 
children. Results for court-mediated outcomes such as the existence and amounts of child support 
orders showed that courts do not allocate child support differentially by child gender. Small but 
suggestive effects of child gender were found on fathers’ post-dissolution investments, but these 
effects disadvantaged boys rather than girls.   
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Of the 73.6 million children in the United States in 2015, 26.8% lived with a single parent (U.S. 
Census Bureau 2015a); and it is estimated that half of all American children will spend time in single 
parent families at some point prior to age 16 (Heuveline et al. 2003). Given that the vast majority of these 
children live with their mothers and that single mother families are much more likely to be poor than 
married couple families and single father families (U.S. Census Bureau 2015a), the allocation and receipt 
of child support for children of nonresident fathers is an important topic for policy makers, researchers, 
and practitioners. In 2015 only about 32% of mothers whose children's fathers were nonresident received 
any child support payment (Grall 2018, Table 2). Researchers are also concerned with the continued 
participation of nonresident fathers in their children’s lives, because it is largely accepted that, after the 
dissolution of the parents’ union (whether marriage, cohabitation, or non-coresidential), a high-quality 
relationship with the father is most often beneficial to children (e.g., Carlson and McLanahan 2004; 
Garasky and Stewart 2007; Neymotin 2014). 
Many studies of child support outcomes have focused on how the characteristics of the parents or 
the child support enforcement environment have affected the likelihood of child support payment and 
receipt.1  More recent work has made inquiry into how the characteristics of the children themselves may 
affect the child support they receive.   One important attribute of children that affects how they are treated 
both by their parents and by society is gender.  Research has produced findings that child gender 
influences families in a surprising number of dimensions, including paternal labor supply, fertility, time 
spent with children, marital satisfaction, and the formation and dissolution of parental unions.2  Taken 
together, the findings have indicated that boys are advantaged in gender-influenced outcomes.   
Seminal work by Beller and Graham (1993) investigated determinants of child support receipt 
 
1 Some examples are Aizer and McLanahan 2006; Allen et al. 2011; Beller and Graham 1993; Case et al. 2003; 
Freeman and Waldfogel 2001; Hanson et al. 1996; Smock and Manning 1997; Sorensen and Hill 2004.  “Child 
support enforcement environment” refers broadly to the laws in place in a given city, state, or region, the resources 
allocated to enforce them (Rich et al. 2007), judicial and individual attitudes toward the provision of child support, 
and other factors such as the availability of off-the-books employment, which impedes wage withholding as a 
mechanism for child support collection (Kurz 1995; Rich et al. 2007). 
2  Lundberg (2005) and Raley and Bianchi (2006) provide reviews. 
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using the first four rounds (1979, 1982, 1984, and 1986) of the March/April Match Current Population 
Survey (CPS) Child Support Supplement (CSS) from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (CPS-CSS), a 
survey with information not commonly available in other child support-related datasets, such as whether 
child support has been awarded and levels of awards (Case et al. 2003).  The CPS-CSS also collected 
information for mothers of all marital statuses – divorced, remarried, separated, and never-married - also 
rarely available in one dataset.3  The current study utilized eight rounds of the survey (1994 – 2008).  For 
purposes of comparability, it described how child support outcomes and the characteristics of child-
support eligible women have changed relative to the profile found by Beller and Graham (1993).4  In 
addition, this investigation extended the research into the relationship of child characteristics to child 
support outcomes, focusing on child gender, specifically, whether the oldest child is a boy.  
I examined the effects of child gender on outcomes influenced by the legal system: existence and 
amount of child support awards and the incidence of joint physical and joint legal custody arrangements; 
and on measures of father involvement: contact, receipt of informal and financial support, and amounts 
received.  Results for court-influenced outcomes suggested that courts do not allocate child support 
differentially by child gender.   Small but suggestive effects of child gender on post-dissolution 
investments by fathers were found, but these effects disadvantaged boys rather than girls.   
Theoretical Framework and Related Literature 
 
Theoretical Framework for Investments in Children from Nonresidential Fathers   
Gary Becker (1960) characterized the economic framework governing childbearing and 
childrearing as investments of time, effort, and money that parents make in their children, with the return 
being the utility (or “psychic income”) that children impart to parents. The determinants of these parental 
investments have been an important area of study because childhood circumstances influence both 
 
3 Married women with child-support eligible children in the CPS-CSS data are referred to as remarried mothers in 
this paper for parsimony, although we cannot observe whether the previous parental union was marriage, 
cohabitation, or not coresidential. 
4 The CSS asks questions in April of the survey year about events of the previous year.  This paper consistently 
refers to the data by the year the survey was fielded, but it should be remembered that the responses reported refer to 
the previous year. 
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children’s current well-being and their economic outcomes in adult life (e.g., Case et al. 2005; Garces et 
al. 2002).   
It has been well-documented that the disruption of the parental union, whether marriage, 
cohabitation, or non-coresidential, changes these parental investments (e.g., Beller and Graham 1993; 
McLanahan and Sandefur 1994).  A number of economic factors have contributed.  Dissolving a union 
incurs transaction costs for relocating family members and developing new routines and networks (Weiss 
and Willis 1985).  Divorcing and separating couples lose economies of scale (Nelson 1988), the increased 
production resulting from specialization (Becker 1973), and the consumption of household public goods 
(Weiss 1997); the same is true, to varying degrees, for cohabitors and couples whose union was not 
coresidential. Unsurprisingly, per person net wealth has been lower for divorced, separated, cohabitating, 
never married, or widowed individuals relative to the married (Wilmoth and Koso 2002;  Zagorsky 2005).  
However, the low amounts of child support paid on both the intensive and extensive margins 
cannot be attributed solely to the post-dissolution decline in total family resources.  The decline in living 
standards has been disproportionately greater for mothers and children relative to fathers (e.g., Daniels et 
al. 2006; Kreider and Fields 2002).  Failure to pay has been correlated with fathers’ unemployment and 
low income (e.g., Ha et al. 2008),5 but there were plenty of financially able fathers who did not pay their 
obligation (Garfinkel and Oellerich 1989; Hill 1992). 
 Economic theories of determinants of child support payments (Beller and Graham 1993; Weiss 
and Willis 1985, 1993) have attributed the disparity between amount owed and amount paid to the 
father’s inability to monitor and control how his contributions are spent;6 mothers may or may not have 
been dedicating all of the money to child-specific goods. This principal-agent problem has led to 
suboptimal investments in children (Weiss and Willis 1993). 
Another economic factor has been that when the father exits the household, the value of the child 
 
5 Note, the mothers of these fathers’ children have been even more disadvantaged than the fathers, because they 
must both parent and work, and because women have been paid less than men (Cancian et al. 2011). 
6 Abundant qualitative evidence has supported this notion, e.g., Edin et al. (2009). 
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as a consumption good (Becker 1960) has likely declined; the marginal utility of expenditure on the child 
was reduced if the father was not present.   This notion is consistent with evidence showing that for 
nonresident fathers who form new families, living with new biological children has been associated with 
reduced child support payments to their noncustodial children (Manning and Smock 2000).  Additionally, 
diminished contact post-dissolution may have reduced the father’s altruism toward the child  (Becker and 
Murphy 1988). 
Related Literature  
Economists’ study of investments from nonresidential fathers has overlapped broadly with the 
inquiry from other disciplines into nonresidential father involvement.  Measures of investment and 
involvement have ranged from the material –  monetary and in-kind child support – to the nonmaterial – 
father-child contact, and the quality of the father-child relationship, including a warm and authoritative 
parenting style (cf. Hofferth et al. 2010).  It has been widely, although not universally, accepted that 
greater father involvement improves outcomes for most children, with the quality of the relationship with 
the father considered to be more salient than simple measures of contact (Amato et al. 2009; Hawkins et 
al. 2007; Hofferth and Pinzon 2011).7  A large body of literature has examined determinants of receiving 
child support awards, the amounts awarded, whether mandated child support funds were received by 
mothers, and the amounts received (e.g., citations in footnote 1).  Understanding the provision of child 
support is important in its own right because it influences child well-being; it has also been found to be 
correlated with contact and relationship quality (e.g. Seltzer 2000, Stewart 2003). 
Beller and Graham (1985; 1993, p. 70; and Graham and Beller 2002) categorized the empirical 
determinants of child support awards and receipt into: (a) the costs and benefits to mothers of obtaining 
support, (b) the father’s ability and desire to provide support, and (c) the legal environment prevailing at 
the time of union disruption (Beller and Graham 1986).  More recently, the literature has turned attention 
to the question of reverse causality, examining how the characteristics of the children themselves may 
 
7 Contact can be beneficial in a father-child relationship, but detrimental if there are negative interactions with the 
child or conflict between the parents (e.g., Hofferth et al. 2010).  
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affect the child support they receive (“child effects”), in addition to the effects on child well-being 
resulting from father’s provision of support (“father effects”)  (e.g., Hawkins et al. 2007, Nepomnyaschy 
et al. 2014).8   
A few early articles investigated the effect of child gender on outcomes which occur subsequent 
to the dissolution of the parental union, such as custody and living arrangements, receipt of child support 
payments and in-kind support, and contact with nonresidential fathers (e.g., Meyer and Garasky 1993; 
Mott 1994; Paasch and Teachman 1991; Seltzer 1991a). Interest has continued to this day (e.g., Meyer 
et al. 2017; Mitchell et al. 2009) but many questions have remained unresolved, in part because of 
differences in data, empirical specifications, inconsistent availability of control variables, and measures of 
investment. 
Numerous studies have found effects of child gender on children’s living arrangements. Fathers 
were more likely to be present in the homes of elementary school aged children if the child was male 
(Mott 1994), and women with sons were more likely than women with daughters to be married at any 
point in time (Teachman and Schollaert 1989). Although effects were not large, the presence of sons 
decreased the probability of divorce (e.g., Dahl and Moretti 2008; Morgan et al. 1988; Spanier and 
Glick 1981); and increased the likelihood that fathers would have custody of a child following divorce 
(Dahl and Moretti 2008). Regarding unmarried couples, evidence indicated that a nonmarital birth was 
more likely followed by marriage, and marriage occurred more quickly, if the child was a son (Dahl and 
Moretti 2008; Lundberg and Rose 2003). Boys were significantly more likely than girls to live in a two-
married-parent home rather than a single mother home (Mammen 2008). Some of these authors and a 
large number of other studies have suggested that sons create a stronger sense of attachment and 
obligation in fathers that keeps them in unions, perhaps as a result of deeper bonding and communication 
between parents and same-sex children (e.g., Marsiglio 1991).   
 
8 The father effects and child effects terminology originated in the psychology literature (e.g., Bell and Chapman 
1986, Russell and Russell 1992).  An early study of child effects in the child support literature was Aughinbaugh 
(2001), who found that higher scores on children’s achievement tests increased the likelihood of receiving child 
support and the amount received. 
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To the extent that they live disproportionately with single mothers, girls have fared worse on 
average than boys, due to the high poverty rates of these families (U.S. Census Bureau 2015a). Have girls 
also been disadvantaged in contributions and involvement from nonresidential fathers? A number of 
studies have found small effects of gender in a surprising direction: Boys rather than girls were 
disadvantaged in the realm of post-dissolution father involvement (Mammen 2008; Paasch and Teachman 
1991; Seltzer 1991a). Paasch and Teachman (1991) proposed that negative results for boys could stem 
from negative selection.  Because boys are thought to need their fathers’ presence as a male role model, 
among fathers of boys, only the more “low-investing” fathers are willing to end their union with the 
mother.  On the other hand, among fathers of girls, some high-investing fathers will exit their parental 
union along with the low-investors, because the high-investing fathers believe it is not necessary to reside 
full-time with their daughters to continue being a good father. Thus the pool of nonresidential fathers of 
daughters is on average of higher quality than the negatively selected pool of nonresidential fathers of 
sons; this is one proposed explanation for why fathers of girls are more likely to pay child support and 
pay higher amounts on average.     
Current Study  
The current study contributes to the literature by further investigating the connection between the 
determinants of child support outcomes, and the effects of child gender on child well-being.  This analysis 
investigated child gender effects on child support outcomes using the CPS-CSS, a large, nationally 
representative dataset, 1994 to 2008, which has information on the existence and amounts of child support 
awards, and which includes mothers of all marital statuses. Two important questions, detailed below, 
were examined. 
First, does gender of the child influence the outcomes that are mediated by the courts: award rates 
and amounts of awards, and custody arrangements?  The existence of a child support award and the 
amount of the award have been significant determinants of child support receipt and therefore of 
children’s financial status (e.g., Beller and Graham 1993; Grall 2018).  While a priori it is not expected 
that child gender will affect court mediated outcomes, it is important to confirm this baseline in any study 
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of child gender effects on child support. 
 Second, does gender of the child affect investments controlled more directly by nonresident 
fathers:  contact, and the amounts and type, formal or informal, of support that are actually contributed?  
Based on the notion of negative selection into the nonresident fathers group and the empirical findings 
discussed earlier, the hypothesis is that oldest child is boy will be negatively correlated with the measures 
of direct father investment.  The findings are important because the research consensus has been that most 
children benefit from maintaining contact with a nonresidential father, especially if the quality of the 
relationship is high (e.g., Carlson and McLanahan 2004; Garasky and Stewart 2007; Neymotin 2014); and 
that formal and informal child support confer both material and nonmaterial benefits to children (Garasky 
et al. 2010; Hofferth et al. 2010; Knox 1996; Nepomnyaschy 2007).  
 
Data, Measures and Methods 
Analysis Sample  
 
The CPS-CSS has provided detailed demographic and family structure information on all 
household members, as well as information on which children had a parent living outside of the 
household, and who therefore may have been eligible for child support (CPS 2010).  The CPS is a 
nationally representative sample of the noninstitutionalized population which is the primary source of 
labor force statistics in the U.S.  The basic questionnaire has been fielded monthly with supplementary 
topical question modules.  The March supplement, also known as the Annual Demographic file, collects 
additional demographic and economic information.  The April supplement, first released in 1979 and 
fielded biannually since 1982, has asked about child support eligibility of household members with 
resident children aged less than 21 whose other parent lives elsewhere.9  Households responding to the 
March and April supplements were then matched to create the CPS-CSS files.  The details and strengths 
of the data are further described in the Appendix.    
 
9 Initially the April supplement was directed only towards mothers; fathers were added in the 1992 survey 
(Scoon-Rogers and Lester 1995). 
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The CPS-CSS was significantly expanded and re-organized prior to the 1994 survey, so that 
precise comparisons were not possible between the 1994 forward data and the earlier years (Grall 2018).  
Therefore the 1994 – 2008 surveys were utilized, and pooled for a larger sample size, comprised of 
12,941 child-support eligible mothers aged 18-40, with children under the age of 12. Because very few 
mothers have a gap of greater than five years between their first and second children (e.g., Dahl and 
Moretti 2008), the children's age restriction was imposed in order to rule out most women whose older 
children lived away from the household and so were not recorded in the data. This was important for 
accurately measuring the right-hand side variable of interest, the gender of the oldest child.   
Measures 
 
Dependent variables.  
There were two types of dependent variables: (a) binary variables which take value one if the 
mother reported this characteristic, and zero if not; and (b) continuous monetary variables, denominated 
in real 2019 U.S. dollars.    
Court-mediated outcomes.   
• Had child support award from the court – binary. 
• Amount of child support mother was owed last year, for the subsample of women who had a 
child support order (CSO) with payment due – continuous.  In this paper the terms amount owed 
and amount due have been used interchangeably. 
• Had joint physical custody with the father – binary. 
• Had joint legal custody with the father – binary. 
Direct father investments.   
• The father had any contact with the child in the last year – binary. 
• The father provided any informal or in-kind support last year – binary:  The survey question 
asked whether the father gave the child(ren) any birthday, holiday, or other gifts, provided clothes 
or food, or paid for child care, summer camp, or any medical expenses.  
• Received any child support last year, for the subsample of women who had a child support order 
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with payment due – binary. 
• Amount of child support mother received last year, for the subsample of women who had a 
child support order with payment due– continuous. 
Independent variables. 
This study has improved upon some of the previous studies of child gender effects on post-
dissolution investments by using an indicator for whether the oldest child is a boy as the measure of child 
gender composition in the family. Gender composition has been endogenous: It has affected parents' 
coresidence with their children, and it has also affected fertility (e.g., Angrist and Evans 1998; Dahl and 
Moretti 2008).  However, the gender of a couple’s first child has been widely considered in the literature 
to be exogenous, if not conditioned on parental partnership status (e.g., Dahl and Moretti 2008, Lundberg 
2005).10 
For the remarried mothers, gender was calculated for her child-support eligible children, thus 
excluding children with her current husband. Mother attributes included to control for socioeconomic 
status were age, education, race, the number of adult men and women in her household, and indicators for 
metropolitan statistical area (MSA) status.  Child characteristics included were whether the father lived in 
the same state, the number of children and the ages of the youngest and oldest children. State-year fixed 
effects controlled for unmeasured influences on child support variables specific to the state and year that 
the mother was asked about, such as economic conditions and the child support enforcement environment. 
Results 
Characteristics of the Sample of Child-Support Eligible Women 
Trends in Child Support Measures 
Figures 1 and 2 show trends over time in child support outcomes: had child support award,  
received any child support if had child support order with payment due, amount owed if had CSO with 
 
10 Because the sample in the current study includes children from mothers of all marital statuses, the results were not 
biased by selection into marital status by child gender. 
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payment due, and amount received if had CSO with payment due.11  Figure 1 series A shows for the CPS-
CSS sample of child–support eligible women with children aged less than 21, the percent who were 
awarded child support by the courts, from the first year of the survey in 1979 through 2008.  Although the 
data were not strictly comparable over time, especially prior to 1994, the figures show no dramatic or 
lasting changes in award rates during this period; the 1979 value is 59.1 and for 2008 it is 56.9.  Pertinent 
to the current investigation, series B shows the award rate for the sample used in this paper, eligible 
women with children aged less than 12, from 1994 to 2008.  Although these award rates were 8 to 13 
percentage points lower than those of the entire CPS-CSS sample, the trend was quite similar.  Series C 
and D show for the subset of eligible women who had a CSO with payment due, the proportion who 
received any payment, for the CPS-CSS sample and the current sample respectively.  The series C receipt 
rates increased from 71.7 % in 1979 to 77.0% in 2008. The receipt rate for the current sample (series D) 
in 1994 was lower than that of the CPS-CSS sample, but series D was quite close to series C in years 
1996 – 2008. 
Figure 2 shows trends in dollar amounts (real $2019) due and received for women with child 
support orders with payment due.  For the CPS-CSS sample the dollar amounts showed greater volatility 
than the award rates from Figure 1, but the pattern was similar – ups and downs over time but no lasting 
shifts, and a lower value in 2008 than in 1979.  The amount due declined slightly from $6,637 to $6,604  
(series A), and amount received from $4,274 to $4,129 (series C).  The current sample showed similar 
patterns in series B and D, although amounts due and received were lower, perhaps because the younger 
children in the current sample had lower expenses or had smaller household sizes than the entire CPS-
CSS sample. 
Sample Summary Statistics 
 Table 1 presents sample averages, pooled and then separately by the marital status subsamples. 
 
11 Beller and Graham (1993) presented time series for survey years 1979 – 1986. As would be expected, the Beller 
Graham numbers, although not included in the figures, conformed almost exactly to the corresponding dates in the 
CPS-CSS series in Figures 1 and 2. 
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The sample comprised 22% divorced mothers, 16% remarried, 12% separated, and 50% never married. 
For child support, socioeconomic status, and demographic measures, magnitudes frequently descended 
monotonically from divorced mothers, to remarried, separated, and then never-married mothers. This held 
true for had child support award, amount owed if had CSO with payment due, amount received if had 
CSO with payment due, had joint physical or joint legal custody, age, and percent of each marital 
subsample which had some college or college plus.  All mothers were more likely to have joint legal 
custody than joint physical custody.12  The statistics confirmed the research consensus that never-married 
mothers are younger, less educated, more likely to be Black, and fare worse in child support outcomes 
than do their ever-married counterparts.  Separated mothers resembled never married mothers in a lower 
likelihood of having a child support award; they resembled divorced mothers in the likelihoods of their 
children having contact with or receiving informal support from the father in the last year.   
Changes Over Time 
 To illustrate how the characteristics of the analysis sample in Table 1 have changed over time, 
Table 2 shows the magnitudes of the differences in the means for the 2008 sample less the means for the 
1994 sample, and which differences were statistically significant.13  As would be expected given the 
continuing increase in nonmarital births over the sample period (U.S. Census Bureau 2015b), row 1 
shows that divorced women were a smaller, and never-married, a larger, proportion of the 2008 sample.  
Child support outcomes were addressed in rows 2 through 5.  As we saw in Figure 1, the award rate 
(row 2) declined by a statistically significant 5 percentage points, driven by a decline in awards to 
divorced mothers.  The child support receipt rate for women with some payment due (row 3) increased 
statistically significantly by 8 percentage points, driven by an increase for never-married mothers.  
 
12 Surprisingly little is known about the prevalence of joint physical and joint legal custody at the national level 
(Bartfeld 2011); the CSS is unusual in collecting nationally representative information. Earlier national figures 
showed that about 5% of divorced families had joint physical custody and 20% had joint legal custody (Nord and 
Zill 1996, Table 1). In the CSS sample in the current study the incidence of both types of custody were higher for 
divorced mothers, reflecting the increase over time in joint custody arrangements after divorce (Bartfeld 2011, 
Cancian et al. 2014). 
13 Tables 5 and 6 in the appendix show averages for the 1994 and 2008 samples respectively.  Results for the 
separated mothers will not be discussed because the sample size is insufficient to estimate credible time trends. 
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Amounts owed for women with some payment due (row 4) decreased for all mothers and for the 
subsamples except never-married mothers, although these differences were not significant. There was 
little change in the average of amounts received for those due some (row 5), but these amounts increased 
significantly for never-married mothers.   
For custody, divorced and never married women showed significant increases in joint physical 
custody over the time period, driving a significant increase in joint physical custody for the sample as a 
whole.14 Never married women showed a significant increase in joint legal custody.15  There were no 
significant differences over time for the proportion of mothers with  contact with the child or informal 
support from the father in the past year.  The differences for education categories, some significant and 
some not, showed a similar pattern across marital status subsamples: a decline in the proportion in the 
lower education categories and an increase in the proportion in the higher education categories, as would 
be expected.  There were some changes in proportions Black and Other Race, which may have been 
related to changes in the questions about race on the survey over this period of time (Grall 2009).16 
Multivariate Analysis 
Empirical Strategy 
Multivariate analyses addressed the question of child’s gender on post-dissolution outcomes.  To 
allow the effect of child gender to vary by the marital status of the mother, the dichotomous gender 
variable, oldest is boy, was interacted with indicators for each marital status; m denoted the categories 
divorced, remarried (where the mother was married to someone other than the child's father), separated, 
or never married.  The main effects of marital status (without interactions) were also entered, with 
 
14 Cancian et al. (2014) studied the increase in joint physical custody arrangements in Wisconsin through 2008 and 
concluded that it was largely driven by changes in social norms. 
15 Chen (2015) studied the increasing incidence of joint legal custody for nonmarital children in Wisconsin in the 
period 1988 – 2009. She concluded that increasing preference for this custody arrangement, encouraged by a policy 
change that made it presumptive, brought about this result, rather than a change in the demographic composition of 
never-married parents. 
16 The remaining significant differences were an increase in the average number of children for separated women, a 
decrease in the presence of never-married women (and the all-women sample) in central-city MSAs, and an increase 
in the household size of divorced women (and the all-women sample).  These characteristics were controlled for in 
the multivariate analysis. 
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divorced (and oldest is girl) the omitted category.  The empirical specification was 
 𝐶 𝛼 𝛽 ∙ 1 𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑏𝑜𝑦 ∙ 1 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑚   
 𝜆 ∙1 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑚 𝑥 𝜃 𝜂 ∙ 1 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 ∙ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑠 𝜀   
 
where i denoted the unit of observation, the mother, and  𝐶 , the dependent variables listed above.  𝛼  
represents the constant term;  𝛽 , the coefficients on the interaction terms of oldest is boy with marital 
status, m = 1, 2, 3, 4 (that is, divorced, remarried, separated and never-married);  𝜆 , the coefficients 
for the main effects of marital status; 𝑥  , the vector of control variables for mother and child 
characteristics with θ the corresponding vector of coefficients;  𝜂 , the coefficients on the state-year 
fixed effects; and 𝜀  the error term. 
The dichotomous dependent variables were coded as one if the event (“success”) occurs (e.g., 
child support is awarded), and zero if it does not.  These specifications were estimated with logit 
regression, a binary response model which predicts the probability that an event occurs, as a function of 
the explanatory variables.  The logistic function is nonlinear, so the magnitude of the marginal effect of 
regressor 𝑥  varies as 𝑥  takes on different values. The logit estimation results were presented as average 
marginal effects, that is, the marginal effects were calculated using the observed values of the regressors 
for each observation, then averaged.17  The interpretation of the average marginal effect is the change in 
 
17 The variables of interest 𝒙 reported in the regressions in the current study were all binary, so the AME for each 
regressor 𝑥  was calculated as follows: for the first observation in the data, 𝑥  is set to one, all other regressors are at 
the observed values for this observation, and 𝑃 𝑦 1|𝑥 1  was calculated.  Then 𝑥  was set to zero, all other 
regressors remained at the observed values for this observation, and 𝑃 𝑦 1|𝑥 0  was calculated.  The 
difference 𝑃 𝑦 1|𝑥 1 𝑃 𝑦 1|𝑥 0  was the marginal effect for the first observation.  This calculation 
was performed for each observation, and the resulting n marginal effects were averaged to obtain the AME. If 
 𝑥 1 represented female and 𝑥 0, male, the AME gave the estimated difference in 𝑃 𝑦 1  between women 
and men, controlling for all other variables.  In this paper the average marginal effects are referred to as simply the 
marginal effects.  There are a number of ways to evaluate marginal effects for nonlinear binary response models, for 
which the following terminology has evolved: calculating average marginal effects at observed values of the 
regressors (AME), marginal effects at the means of the regressors (MEM), or marginal effects at representative 
values of the regressors (ME).  Noted advantages of AMEs were that they use all of the data and the use of observed 
values of the regressors yields more “realistic” estimates (Bartus 2005; Cameron and Trivedi 2010, p. 343; Williams 
2012). 
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the probability of the event occurring, 𝑃 𝑦 1 , given the change in 𝑥 .  Ordinary least squares analysis 
was applied to the specification for amount child support owed, for women with a CSO and payment due.  
Tobit analysis was used for the specification for amount child support received last year, women with a 
CSO and payment due, in order to account for the observations recorded as receiving zero.  
Multivariate Results  
Table 3 examines child support and custody outcomes of the legal system; Table 4 turns to 
outcomes more in the charge of fathers: contact and informal support, and receipt and amounts of child 
support payments.  Table 3 shows no statistically significant effects of having an oldest boy on the court-
mediated outcomes, but there were statistical differences between mothers of different marital statuses.  
Column 1 reports results for the effect of child gender and marital status on the indicator for whether the 
mother had a child support award in place last year. The marginal effects for the interaction terms (marital 
status*oldest is boy) in the logit regressions are calculated as the amount by which the probability of 
having a child support award differs for mothers whose oldest was a boy, relative to women with the 
same marital status whose oldest was a girl. For instance, a divorced mother whose oldest was a boy was 
2.9 percentage points less likely to have a child support award than a divorced mother with an eldest girl. 
However, this effect was not statistically significant, therefore likely due to chance and not representative 
of a true effect in the population.  
The marginal effects of the marital status main effects are calculated as the amount by which the 
probability of having a child support award differs for mothers of that marital status whose oldest was a 
girl, relative to divorced mothers whose oldest was a girl.  Remarried mothers with oldest girls were 
8 percentage points less likely, never-married mothers 19.6 percentage points less likely, and separated 
mothers at 22.2 percentage points the least likely, to have a child support award, statistically significant at 
the 1% level.  The differences between the remarried coefficient, and the separated and never-married 
coefficients, were statistically significant. 18 
 
18 These and subsequent statements of statistical differences between coefficients for the remarried, separated, and 
never-married mothers groups were based on unreported computations, and significant at the 5% or 1% levels.  
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There were no statistically significant differences by child gender in Column 2 where the 
dependent variable was the amount of child support owed, for the subsample of women who had a child 
support order with payment due.  Among the marital status categories, separated and never-married 
mothers’ amounts due were lower than divorced mothers’ at the 10% and 0.1% significance levels 
respectively; the never-married mothers’ coefficient was also statistically significantly lower than  the 
remarried mothers coefficient. In Columns 3 and 4, having an oldest boy made no significant difference 
for the custody arrangements, but marital status did, with divorced mothers most likely to have had one of 
these joint arrangements and never-married mothers statistically significantly least likely. 
Table 4 presents results for nonresident fathers’ potential investments in their children.  Column 1 
shows that father-child contact in the past year was 2.1 percentage points less likely for never-married 
mother with oldest boy than for never married mothers with oldest girl, significant at the 10% level. 
Although the significance level is marginal, this result suggests that boys are disadvantaged and is 
consistent with the notion that nonresident fathers of oldest boys are a negatively selected group.  In 
Column 2 the father-contact specification was re-estimated on a larger sample including women with 
older children – up to age 17.  For this group both the remarried and never-married mothers of oldest boys 
have lower father-child contact relative to their counterparts with oldest girls, both significant at the 10% 
levels.19 
For receipt of  informal support (Column 3) there were no significant effects of having an oldest 
boy, but statistical differences existed between mothers of different marital statuses.  Separated mothers 
were the most likely to receive informal support, significantly so relative to remarried and never-married 
mothers; never-married mothers were least likely, significantly so relative to all other mothers.   
For the subsample of women with child support orders with payment due, divorced mothers 
whose eldest is boy had a 4.3% lower likelihood of receiving child support than did divorced mothers of 
eldest girls, although this estimate was significant only at the 10% level (Column 4).  The marginal effect 
 
19 Thanks to the referee who suggested investigating father contact for the older children.  
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on amount child support received was also negative for the divorced mothers with eldest boy relative to 
those with eldest girl (Column 5), with magnitude $412.15, but not statistically significant at conventional 
levels (p = 0.156)  
To sum up, the court system did not allocate child support awards differently for oldest boys.  
Child gender did not make a difference for whether mothers shared joint physical custody or joint legal 
custody with fathers. There were some small but suggestive effects of having an oldest boy on father’s 
post-dissolution investments in children. Father-child contact was lower for never-married mothers, and 
for remarried mothers with children younger than 18, relative to their counterparts with an oldest girl.  For 
women with a child support order with payment due, divorced mothers of oldest boys were less likely to 
have received any child support relative to divorced mothers of oldest girls. 
 
Discussion 
Summary and Comparison with Previous Results  
A notable result here is that, as hypothesized, child gender does not affect the existence or amount 
of a child support award, across all marital statuses of the mothers. This may not be surprising at first 
glance, but there is evidence that child support awards often deviate from states’ presumptive formulas.  
The finding with a large national sample that child gender is not a factor in these legal outcomes is an 
important one. It also suggests that any gender effects we find for the remaining outcomes are influenced 
only by parental behavior and not by child support obligations which differ by child gender. 
For the second hypothesis, that having an oldest boy would be negatively correlated with the 
more direct father investments, suggestive supporting evidence is found for never-married and remarried 
mothers in terms of father-child contact, and for divorced mothers’ child support receipt rates.   These 
results are consistent with earlier research finding slight disadvantages for boys with nonresidential 
fathers. Seltzer (1991a) found in a sample of divorced, separated, and never-married mothers that sons are 
less likely to receive any child support or any paternal visits than are girls. For divorced fathers of at least 
one son relative to divorced fathers of all girls, Paasch and Teachman (1991) found they are less likely to 
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pay for dental care and carry medical insurance, while Mammen (2008) found they are less likely to pay 
any child support.20 The results are also consistent with the notion that divorced fathers of boys are a 
negatively selected group relative to divorced fathers of girls (Paasch and Teachman 1991).   
A more recent study of adolescents, with more detailed measures of father contact, found girls 
and boys equally involved with fathers on most measures, including payment of any child support, 
although boys experienced more overnights stays, sports, and movies (Mitchell et al. 2009).  Father 
involvement was found to benefit both boys and girls on measures of well-being, with only slight 
differences. Notably, though, within subgroups there was some evidence of disadvantage to boys: 
(a) Boys born outside of marriage were statistically significantly less likely to receive any child support 
from nonresident fathers than are girls21; (b) in the Black subsample, daughters were statistically 
significantly more likely to receive child support from, and to have recently talked to, their nonresident 
fathers, although the authors did not emphasize these results. 
Limitations of the Current Study 
 
 A limitation of this study, common to many investigations of post-dissolution parenting, is the 
lack of information on the nonresident fathers. The CSS relied on mothers’ reports of fathers’ 
contributions, which may differ from fathers’ reports (Braver et al. 1991; Seltzer and Brandreth 1994). 
Regarding fathers’ demographic profiles, many of the demographic characteristics of the mothers’ 
households were controlled for, which typically correlate with the fathers’ (Tach et al. 2010) and provide 
a rough proxy. However, the CSS had no measures of fathers’ parenting styles, their relationships with 
their children prior to dissolution, whether they are involved with a new partner, or other factors that have 
been shown to be significant for fathers’ post-dissolution involvement (Amato and Gilbreth 1999). The 
study would benefit greatly from more details on the types, levels, and tenor of nonresident fathers’ 
interactions with their children, because it is generally agreed that the quality and closeness of the father-
 
20 Mammen (2008) also found that never-married mothers with at least one son received smaller amounts of child 
support than did never-married mothers of all daughters.  
21 An arguably related finding was that being born outside of marriage significantly increased sons’ but not 
daughters’ externalizing problems. 
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child relationship is crucial to the time spent with fathers increasing children’s well-being (Arditti and 
Keith 1993; Majumder 2016).   
 
Contributions of the Current Study 
 
The CPS-CSS allows examination of the full range of marital statuses of child-support eligible 
mothers and a greater array of outcomes, for a larger, more representative sample than has been available 
for most other studies of child gender. The findings add to our knowledge of child gender effects on 
fathers’ post-dissolution investments in children as follows.  First, the results here are the first using 
nationally representative data to show for women of all marital statuses that the likelihood of obtaining a 
child support award and the mandated amounts of awards are not affected by child gender.  Second, I 
disaggregate women by all marital statuses and find child gender effects for never-married, remarried, and 
divorced women; other studies which group women differently (such as separated and divorced women 
together, or marital and nonmarital births) may mask these effects. 
Finally and most importantly, these results confirm that although we should not automatically 
assume that gender matters in every situation (Mitchell et al. 2009), neither should we dismiss the 
possibility of gender effects in a given situation without careful investigation. The small but significant 
disadvantages to boys post-dissolution are found in different samples, different time periods, and different 
specifications. The effects of child gender deserve continued attention given the important role gender 
plays in people's life chances. 
 
Directions for Future Research 
These results highlight the value of continued research on the nuances of family structure to 
inform assessment of how the different types of families they live in affect girls and boys.  More 
information on how outcomes differ across family types and by children’s characteristics is needed, 
especially for emerging family configurations, such as the increasing prevalence of single father families 
and multiple partner fertility.   
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Two recent studies of father involvement which control for the existence of subsequent partners 
and children of both of the child’s parents, find no gender effects on fathers’ post-dissolution involvement 
with the child (Garasky et al. 2010; Tach et al. 2010). Another study finds, however, that fathers with any 
coresidential sons visit nonresidential children less often than fathers with only coresidential daughters 
(Guzzo 2009).  More inquiry is needed to determine whether the evolution of new family forms is 
reducing the effects of gender or simply making them more difficult to detect. 
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Table 1 
Sample Averages 
Child-Support Eligible Mothers with Children under 12 

















Proportion of sample 1  0.22  0.16  0.12  0.50 
Had child support award 0.50  0.68  0.62  0.42  0.39 
Rcvd any CS, if had CSO with $ due 0.73  0.77  0.79  0.73  0.67 
Amount owed, if had CSO with $ due 5,487  6,559  5,869  5,567  4,367 
Amount rcvd, if had CSO with $ due 3,204  4,141        3,831  3,129  2,094 
Joint physical custody 0.09  0.16  0.13  0.08  0.05 
Joint legal custody 0.15  0.28  0.22  0.14  0.07 
Any contact with father last year 0.70  0.77  0.70  0.76  0.66 
Any informal support last year 0.56  0.64  0.57  0.65  0.50 
Oldest child is boy 0.49  0.49  0.50  0.49  0.49 
Age 28.22  31.31  29.80  29.51  26.01 
Father lives in state 0.78  0.77  0.73  0.81  0.80 
Less than high school 0.19  0.10  0.16  0.21  0.24 
High school only 0.38  0.36  0.37  0.37  0.40 
Some college 0.33  0.39  0.36  0.32  0.30 
College or more 0.09  0.15  0.12  0.10  0.05 
White 0.65  0.82  0.83  0.72  0.50 
Black 0.30  0.13  0.12  0.24  0.45 
Other race 0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04 
Number of children 1.54  1.59  1.33  1.82  1.51 
Has 1 child 0.61  0.56  0.74  0.43  0.64 
Has 2 children 0.27  0.33  0.21  0.38  0.25 
Has 3 children 0.09  0.09  0.05  0.14  0.09 
Has 4 or more children 0.03  0.03  0.01  0.05  0.03 
Central city-MSA 0.32  0.23  0.21  0.30  0.40 
Household size 3.75  3.33  4.42  3.57  3.76 
Observations (unweighted) 12,941  3,039  2,197  1,533  6,172 
Observations: had CSO with $ due 5,832  1,919  1,310  522  2,081 
Observations: rcvd any CS last year 5,687  1,711  1,207  626  2,143 
Notes:  1994 - 2008 March-April Match Current Population Survey Child Support weighted with April supplement 
sample weights.  Counts of children are for the mother's resident children aged 11 or younger with a nonresident father.  
Receipt and amounts are for the previous calendar year; amounts are in real 2019 U.S. dollars.  For remarried mothers 
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 Table 2 
 Differences in Means: 2008 Sample Values Less 1994 Sample Values 
 Child-support Eligible Mothers with Children under 12 


















1 Proportion of sample   -0.06***  0.00  -0.02  0.08*** 
2 Had child support award -0.05**  -0.09**  -0.06  0.07*  -0.01 
3 Rcvd any CS, if had CSO with $ due 0.08**  0.04  0.056  0.16†   0.16** 
4 Amount owed, if had CSO with $ due -339  -102  -584  -460  74 
5 Amount rcvd, if had CSO with $ due 8  -318  87  120  781** 
6 Joint physical custody 0.03**  0.08**  0.00  0.04  0.04*** 
7 Joint legal custody 0.01  0.04  0.03  0.003  0.03** 
8 Any contact with father last year -0.02  -0.02  -0.06  -0.00  0.01 
9 Any informal support last year -0.00  -0.01  -0.03  -0.03  0.04 
10 Oldest child is boy 0.03  0.01  -0.02  0.18***  0.01 
11 Age 0.090  0.405  0.19  0.80  0.51** 
12 Father lives in state 0.03**  0.07**  0.05  0.03  0.02 
13 Less than high school -0.05**  -0.03  -0.01  -0.10**  -0.08** 
14 High school only -0.04**  -0.08**  -0.10**  -0.04  -0.01 
15 Some college 0.05**  0.01  0.07  0.07  0.06** 
16 College or more 0.05***  0.09**  0.05  0.07**  0.03** 
17 White -0.01  -0.05  0.01  0.03  0.04 
18 Black -0.02  0.00  -0.07**  -0.04  -0.07** 
19 Other race 0.03***  0.05**  0.06**  0.01  0.02** 
20 Number of children -0.01  -0.02  0.02  0.20**  -0.05 
21 Has 1 child 0.01  0.03  -0.01  -0.07  0.01 
22 Has 2 children -0.01  -0.03  0.00  -0.01  0.01 
23 Has 3 children 0.00  -0.01  0.01  0.04  0.00 
24 Has 4 or more children 0.00  0.01  0.00  0.04  -0.02* 
25 Central city-MSA -0.04**  0.03  0.02  -0.07  -0.11*** 
26 Household size 0.13**  0.21**  0.190  0.25  -0.02 
 Notes:  1994 and 2008 March-April Match Current Population Survey Child Support weighted with April supplement 
sample weights.  Counts of children are for the mother's resident children aged 11 and under with a nonresident father.  
Receipt and amounts are for the previous calendar year; amounts are in real 2019 dollars.  For remarried mothers the 
child-support eligible children are from a previous relationship.  P-value notation indicates a statistically significant 
difference between the 2008 mean and the 1994 mean. 








Effect of Oldest is Boy on Child Support Awards and Custody Outcomes 
Child-Support Eligible Mothers with Children under 12 
 1  2  3  4 


















    
    
 
   
Divorced * Oldest is boy -0.029  -56.95  -0.005  0.016 
 (0.020)  (259.49)  (0.015)  (0.012) 
Remarried * Oldest is boy 0.004  -14.02  0.024  0.008 
 (0.023)  (242.22)  (0.016)  (0.012) 
Separated * Oldest is boy -0.019  54.47  -0.028  -0.016 
 (0.028)  (411.39)  (0.018)  (0.015) 
Never-married * Oldest is boy -0.004  24.35  -0.009  -0.003 
 (0.014)  (182.86)  (0.009)  (0.008) 
Divorced  (omitted category)        
Remarried -0.080***  -215.20  -0.062***  -0.029** 
 (0.023)  (256.36)  (0.016)  (0.012) 
Separated  -0.222*** -
5
-590.98†  -0.079***  -0.026* 
 (0.024)  (348.51)  (0.017)  (0.014) 
Never-married  -0.196***  -957.77***  -0.120***  -0.045*** 
 (0.018)  (235.17)  (0.013)  (0.011) 
Observations 12,941  5,832  12,941  12,941 
R2 / Pseudo R2 0.110  0.199  0.179  0.145 
Notes:  standard errors are presented in parentheses.  The unit of observation is the mother.  State-year 
fixed effects are included in all regressions. Other regressors are ages of the mother and of her oldest and 
youngest child, number of adult women and number of adult men in the household; indicators for 
whether father lives in the same state; number of children (2, 3, 4 or more); White, Black; central-city-
MSA, balance of MSA and non-MSA; high school only, some college, college or more, and an intercept.  
The omitted category for number of children is one; for race Other; for MSA status "unidentifiable"; for 
educational status, less than high school.  Amounts owed are for the previous calendar year, reported in 
real 2019 terms using the Consumer Price Index. 










Effect of Oldest is Boy on Father Contact and Support 
Child-support Eligible Mothers with Children under 12 or under 18 
 1  2  3  4  5 
 Logit AMEs  Logit AMEs  Logit AMEs  Logit AMEs  Tobit 
 














had CSO  
with $ due 
    
    
 
   
 kids < 12  kids < 18  kids < 12  kids < 12  kids < 12 
Divorced * Oldest is boy 0.002  -0.008  0.015  -0.043†  -412.15 
 (0.017)  (0.013)  (0.019)  (0.023)  (291.05) 
Remarried * Oldest is boy -0.015  -0.025†  -0.015  0.033  245.11 
 (0.021)  (0.015)  (0.023)  (0.027)  (298.75) 
Separated * Oldest is boy 0.002  0.009  -0.002  0.024  235.54 
 (0.023)  (0.019)  (0.026)  (0.040)  (474.94) 
Never-married * Oldest is boy -0.021†  -0.019†  -0.017  -0.003  -153.72 
 (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.014)  (0.021)  (227.78) 
Divorced  (omitted category)          
Remarried -0.033  -0.027†  -0.019  -0.010  -132.43 
 (0.020)  (0.015)  (0.022)  (0.027)  (321.83) 
Separated  -0.007  -0.020  0.030  -0.040  -829.92* 
 (0.020)  (0.016)  (0.023)  (0.032)  (383.77) 
Never-married  -0.070***  -0.080***  -0.073***  -0.048**  -1,091.48*** 
 (0.016)  (0.013)  (0.018)  (0.023)  (269.93) 
Observations 12,941  19,904  12,941  5,832  5,832 
R2 / Pseudo R2 0.128  0.114  0.057  0.132  0.014 
Notes:  standard errors are presented in parentheses. The unit of observation is the mother.  State-year fixed effects are 
included in all regressions. Other regressors are ages of the mother and of her oldest and youngest child, number of adult 
women and number of adult men in the household; indicators for whether father lives in the same state; number of children 
(2, 3, 4 or more); White, Black; central-city-MSA, balance of MSA and non-MSA; high school only, some college, college 
or more, and an intercept.  The omitted category for number of children is one; for race Other; for MSA status 
"unidentifiable"; for educational status, less than high school.  Amounts owed are for the previous calendar year, reported in 
real 2019 terms using the Consumer Price Index. 









Notes: The CPS-CSS Sample figures represent all mothers with  child-support eligible children aged less than 21.  The 
figures are taken from the Census Bureau published tabulations of the CPS-CSS data as follows: 
1979-1990: Lester 1991, Table B, rows 2 and 7 
1992: Scoon-Rogers and Lester 1995, author calculations from Table B, Column 3, rows 1-4 
1994-2008: Grall 2018, Table 2, rows 14 and 19 
The Current Sample figures are author’s calculations from the analysis sample of 12,941 child-support eligible women 















Notes: The CPS-CSS Sample figures represent all mothers with  child-support eligible children aged less than 21.  
The figures are taken from the Census Bureau published tabulations of the CPS-CSS data as follows: 
1979-1990: Lester 1991, Table F, rows 2 and 3 
1992: Scoon-Rogers and Lester 1995, author calculations from Table D Column 2, rows 2 and 3 
1994-2008: Grall 2018, Table 2, rows 16 and 17 
The Current Sample figures are author’s calculations from the analysis sample of 12,941 women with child-support 
eligible women with children aged less than 12. 









 The CSS data had a number of strengths.  
1. The CSS contained measures of outcomes of the legal system such as the existence and 
amounts of child support orders that mothers have been awarded by the court, and whether the father had 
joint physical custody or joint legal custody of the child(ren), for women of all marital statuses.  
2. The CSS identified children living with a mother and a stepfather who were child-support 
eligible - that is, which children in married-parent homes were born in previous unions. Married women 
were sometimes omitted from studies of post-dissolution outcomes when this information was not 
available. For parsimony these women are referred to as remarried mothers in this paper, although the 
previous parental union could have been marriage, cohabitation, or not coresidential. This was an 
important group to study because in well-being measures, children living with stepfathers do no better 
than children of single mothers (e.g., McLanahan and Sandefur 1994, p. 90). Evidence has also suggested 
that remarriage reduced amounts of child support from nonresident fathers (Hill 1992).   
3. It is likely that child support amounts were measured more accurately in the CSS than in some 
other surveys, because the CSS questions were asked directly of all household members 15 and over who 
had children living with them (CPS 2010). In contrast, in the March CPS, for example, one household 
member was asked about all other members (Campanelli et al. 2005, p. 425).   
  
 




Sample Averages for 1994 sample 
Child-support Eligible Mothers with Children under 12 

















Proportion of sample 1  0.25  0.15  0.14  0.46 
Had child support award 0.48  0.70  0.63  0.35  0.35 
Rcvd any CS, if had CSO with $ due 0.69  0.75  0.77  0.64  0.57 
Amount owed, if had CSO with $ due 5,185  5,668  6,137  5,248  3,974 
Amount rcvd, if had CSO with $ due 2,865  3,741  3,813  2,624  1,270 
Joint physical custody 0.06  0.11  0.11  0.07  0.02 
Joint legal custody 0.14  0.26  0.19  0.14  0.05 
Any contact with father last year 0.69  0.78  0.68  0.77  0.62 
Any informal support last year 0.55  0.64  0.55  0.69  0.47 
Oldest child is boy 0.48  0.49  0.50  0.43  0.49 
Age 28.17  31.01  29.69  29.05  25.87 
Father lives in state 0.77  0.76  0.70  0.80  0.78 
Less than high school 0.23  0.12  0.15  0.28  0.30 
High school only 0.39  0.38  0.42  0.39  0.38 
Some college 0.32  0.38  0.35  0.28  0.28 
College or more 0.07  0.11  0.09  0.05  0.05 
White 0.65  0.86  0.83  0.70  0.47 
Black 0.31  0.11  0.14  0.27  0.48 
Other race 0.04  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.05 
Number of children 1.56  1.58  1.35  1.72  1.56 
Has 1 child 0.59  0.55  0.70  0.45  0.63 
Has 2 children 0.29  0.33  0.25  0.41  0.24 
Has 3 children 0.09  0.10  0.05  0.10  0.09 
Has 4 or more children 0.03  0.02  0.00  0.03  0.04 
Central city-MSA 0.35  0.26  0.20  0.34  0.45 
Household size 3.69  3.22  4.25  3.50  3.82 
Observations (unweighted) 2,099  572  313  289  925 
Observations: had CSO with $ due 917  373  193  82  269 
Observations: rcvd any CS last year 899  336  176  110  277 
Notes:  1994 March-April Match Current Population Survey Child Support weighted with April supplement sample 
weights.  Counts of children are for the mother's resident children aged 11 or younger with a nonresident father.  Receipt 
and amounts are for the previous calendar year; amounts are in real 2019 U.S. dollars.  For remarried mothers the child-
support eligible children are from a previous relationship. 
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Table 6 
Sample Averages for 2008 sample 
Child-support Eligible Mothers with Children under 12 

















Proportion of sample 1  0.19  0.15  0.12  0.55 
Had child support award 0.43  0.62  0.56  0.42  0.34 
Rcvd any CS, if had CSO with $ due 0.77  0.79  0.83  0.80  0.72 
Amount owed, if had CSO with $ due 4,846  5,566  5,553  4,788  4,048 
Amount rcvd, if had CSO with $ due 2,873  3,423  3,901  2,745  2,051 
Joint physical custody 0.10  0.20  0.11  0.11  0.06 
Joint legal custody 0.15  0.30  0.21  0.15  0.08 
Any contact with father last year 0.67  0.76  0.62  0.76  0.63 
Any informal support last year 0.55  0.63  0.52  0.66  0.50 
Oldest child is boy 0.51  0.50  0.48  0.61  0.50 
Age 28.26  31.42  29.88  29.85  26.38 
Father lives in state 0.80  0.83  0.75  0.84  0.80 
Less than high school 0.18  0.09  0.13  0.18  0.22 
High school only 0.35  0.31  0.32  0.35  0.37 
Some college 0.36  0.40  0.41  0.35  0.34 
College or more 0.12  0.20  0.14  0.12  0.08 
White 0.64  0.81  0.84  0.73  0.51 
Black 0.29  0.12  0.07  0.23  0.42 
Other race 0.07  0.08  0.09  0.05  0.07 
Number of children 1.55  1.56  1.38  1.92  1.51 
Has 1 child 0.60  0.58  0.69  0.38  0.63 
Has 2 children 0.28  0.30  0.25  0.40  0.25 
Has 3 children 0.09  0.09  0.06  0.14  0.09 
Has 4 or more children 0.03  0.02  0.00  0.07  0.02 
Central city-MSA 0.31  0.28  0.22  0.27  0.35 
Household size 3.82  3.42  4.44  3.74  3.80 
Observations (unweighted) 1,370  279  212  158  721 
Observations: had CSO with $ due 555  166  110  58  221 
Observations: rcvd any CS last year 566  158  109  65  234 
Notes:  2008 March-April Match Current Population Survey Child Support weighted with April supplement sample 
weights.  Counts of children are for the mother's resident children aged 11 or younger with a nonresident father.  Receipt 
and amounts are for the previous calendar year; amounts are in real 2019 U.S. dollars.  For remarried mothers the child-
support eligible children are from a previous relationship. 
 
 
